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SHERMAN ACT LIABILITY FOR A RELIGIOUSLY
MOTIVATED BOYCOTT
INTRODUCTION
For almost a century the Sherman Act' has been the "Magna
Carta"2 of the American free enterprise system. The principle of com-
mercial competition protected by the Act is rooted in religious
doctrine.3 Nevertheless, as evidenced by the Sherman Act, it has been
necessary to restrain those in competition from undue destruction of
competitors and oppression of consumers.4 The Act prohibits unfair
practices to insure equality of opportunity.
Congress left interpretation and application of the competitive
objectives of the antitrust laws to the discretion of the courts.' The
1. The substantive provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1, 2 (1976)
contain two main prohibitions:
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanour ...
2.
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preserva-
tion of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And
the freedoms guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small,
is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion,
and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Marshall, J.). See also Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 n.16 (1978).
3. John Calvin proclaimed man's obligation to work-manufacture and trade
in articles of commerce-to continue the creative work of God. Resulting profits were
God's rewards. The Puritan form of Calvinism sanctified the "work ethic," giving rise
to the doctrine of laissezfaire. Even the Catholic Church commended commercial com-
petition. But all religions tempered the commandment to compete with an admonition
to "do justice and to love mercy": a religious ethic for businessmen. See J. VAN CISE
& W. LIFLAND, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 2-15 (8th ed. 1980).
4. Id.
5. In the antitrust field courts in 'particular "have been accorded, by com-
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courts have unflinchingly applied and enforced the antitrust laws8 when
the actors are businessmen and their conduct tends to restrain or
monopolize commercial intercourse. But when the actors are not
businessmen and their purpose is not commercial, the appliciability
of the antitrust laws becomes questionable, especially when the ac-
tors' motivation is integrally intertwined with the exercise of first
amendment rights.7 Accordingly, a boycott8 motivated by political,
religious or social concerns, as opposed to a boycott designed to ex-
tract a business advantage at the expense of competitors,' poses a
problem requiring "delicate balanc[ing]"'' by the judiciary.
mon consent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted law." United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944). See also infra note 9.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
8. Typically, a boycott, or concerted refusal to deal, is an agreement among
individuals to sever or limit relations with a designated firm(s) or individual(s) as well
as attempts to induce others to do so. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AN-
TITRUST 229-32 (1977).
9. See e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (in-
voking a boycott per se rule where retailers induced manufacturers not to sell to com-
peting retailers); Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (invok-
ing a boycott per se rule where retailer induced manufacturers and distributors not
to sell to competing retailer); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
(invoking a boycott per se rule where manufacturers induced retailers not to buy from
competing manufacturers). See also, Cockerill, Application of Noerr-Pennington and the
First Amendment to Politically Motivated Economic Boycotts: Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 85 (1979):
The common thread running through these leading boycott cases is the
intent, express or implied, to impair or destroy competition in a commer-
cial setting. The per se rule developed in these cases is applied when there
exists a combination to boycott or refuse to deal that restrains trade,
monopolizes, or lessen competition. An important factor in these and other
group boycott cases in which antitrust liability has been imposed is that
economic benefit can be traced to the principals, while economic detri-
ment is suffered by the target of the boycott.
Id. at 89.
10. Costello v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing district court's
grant of summary judgment and holding Roman Catholic Church organizations that
allegedly engaged in boycott activities directed at the distributor of an unauthorized
religious book were not altogether exempt from antitrust scrutiny simply because their
motives were religious; on remand the court must "balance" the competing interests
of religious freedom and competition).
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Courts have "balanced" political and social concerns expressed
through anticompetitive boycotts or restraints of trade and have
resolved the issue-though somewhat ambigously-in favor of the first
amendment right to petition,11 federalism"2 and the national labor
policy. 3 An unresolved conflict exists between the free exercise of
religion guaranteed by the first amendment' 4 and the antitrust laws:
does a religiously motivated boycott fall within the realm of antitrust
laws? Consider the following hypothetical situation:
A religious organization notifies booksellers that a publisher's
book is not an approved copy of their liturgy. They request the
booksellers not distribute the book in order to preserve the in-
tegrity of the liturgy (public prayer). As a result the market for
the publisher's book vanishes. 5
Absent the religious purpose of maintaining the integrity of their
adherents' beliefs, the religious organization's conduct, coupled with
11. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (con-
certed efforts to influence public officials do not violate antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (concerted effort to persuade legislature or executive
to take action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly not
prohibited by the Sherman Act). Accord, California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (concerted efforts to influence administrative agencies
and courts respecting resolution of business and economic interests vis-6a-vis com-
petitors not proscribed by Sherman Act; held, however, defendants' actions a "sham"
and not exempt). See also infra notes 101-23 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (action of the state in its
sovereign capacity exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (boycott to influence passage of Equal Rights
Amendment not within the scope of the antitrust law). See also infra notes 68-80 and
accompanying text.
13. See e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (a combination
of employees restraining competition in the sale of their services to an employer not
condemned by the Sherman Act); Allied Int'l., Inc. v. International Longshoreman's
Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 1656
(1981) (see especially 1659, n.6). (union's refusal to handle cargoes bound for or arriving
from Soviet Union in protest of invasion of Afghanistan not violative of Sherman Act).
See also infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text. See generally Bird, Sherman Act
Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247 (1970);
Cockerill, supra note 9; Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense,
56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1961-62); Fischell, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence
Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHi.
L. REV. 80 (1977-78); Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
1131 (1980).
14. See supra note 7.
15. See Costello v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also infra notes
125-32.
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the booksellers' cooperation, would clearly be an unlawful restraint
of trade. Yet when political and social concerns are at issue, the ex-
emptions the Court has carved out indicate motive or purpose is an
important consideration in ascertaining antitrust liability. The general
community's interest in conducting commerce free of anticompetitive
arrangements must be balanced against the first amendment's
guarantee of religious freedom.
Immunity or exemption from the Act, based upon the free exer-
cise clause, is complicated, however, by the tension between the
religious group's free exercise guarantee and the establishment com-
mand. Though belief is held inviolate, protecting religious action that
trenches upon other protected rights violates the establishment ban.
More specifically, even if the religious group's activity were in fur-
therance of a genuine expression of belief, an immunity from antitrust
liability in spite of anticompetitive market impact would run afoul of
the establishment clause.16 In short, a court must balance the first
amendment against the antitrust policy and in so doing maintain the
balance between the free exercise and establishment mandates.
The focus of this note is the interplay of antitrust objectives with
the first amendment free exercise clause and its correlative establish-
ment clause, which results in the inevitable encroachment of each upon
the other. An examination of judicial interpretation of the Sherman
Act, in light of its legislative history, suggests that, despite anti-
competitive effects, a religiously motivated boycott is not within the
scope of the Act. This is particularly true when viewed in light of
other judicially created exemptions. Regardless, the interrelatedness
of the seemingly opposing demands of the two religion clauses and
the problem of defining religion for determining the bona fides of an
asserted religious belief makes a blanket exemption unjustified. Most
importantly, national antitrust policies are not lightly to be set aside. 7
Hence, it appears inevitable that the courts must undertake the
"delicate balancing," and where less drastic means are available to
a religious group, it must comply with the dictates of the Sherman Act.
16. See infra note 167.
17. The court has repeatedly stressed the pre-eminence of the public policy
embodied in the antitrust laws. "Congress, exercising the full extent of its constitu-
tional power, sought to establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle
governing commerce in this country." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 398. "Congress 'exercis[ed]
all the power it possessed' under the Commerce Clause when it approved the Sher-
man Act." California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 105 (1980) (citation omitted).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss3/6
SHERMAN ACT LIABILITY
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT
To RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED BOYCOTTS
Legislative History
Whether religious organizations whose activities restrain trade
are excluded from the Sherman Act is initially a question of statutory
construction. The prohibitions of the Act are not precisely stated, nor
are they defined."8 The critical words relevant to a religiously
motivated boycott are, "Every . . . combination . . . or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce." A literal reading of this language
indicates liability no matter how laudable the actors' aim or how in-
cidental the restraint. As a result, the Supreme Court has noted, while
considering the breadth of the Act's language, that "the Sherman Act
... cannot mean what it says."19 But the Court has always interpreted
the Act expansively: "[language more comprehensive is difficult to
conceive. On its face it shows a careful, studied attempt to bring within
the Act every person engaged in business whose activities might
restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the states."20
Courts have necessarily relied on the legislative history in ascertaining
the Act's applicability to a given case."
Legislative history is not conclusive of a statute's interpretation.
This is particularly true of laws formulated in the democratic process
where diverse opinions and cross purposes exits. But the history does
provide a frame of reference for determining legislative intent. The
Sherman Act's legislative history,' read in light of the then public
sentiment," indicates a clear intent to proscribe commercially
motivated restraints. Little or nothing is said, however, regarding a
religiously motivated restraint. The law was inspired by the predatory
tactics of the giant trusts 4 of the day. These commercial combinations
18. See supra note 1.
19. National Society of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
687 (1977).
20. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
21. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). "[Tlhe courts have been
left to give content to the statute, and in the performance of that function it is ap-
propriate that courts should interpret its words in light of its legislative history and
of the particular evils at which the legislation was aimed." Id. at 489.
22. See generally Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,
23 U. OF CH. L. REV. 221 (1951); E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW S 4 (1980); A.
WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW (1910).
23. See Letwin supra note 22, at 222-25.
24. For a judicial description of the trust device created by Dobb, a Standard
Oil lawyer, see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 211 U.S. 1 (1911); State ex rel. At-
19831
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were injurious to purchasers and consumers of goods and services
and threatened the competitive system. But the language of the Act
sweeps beyond the regulation of trusts.
The debates between Senator Sherman and the bill's opponents
indicate a narrower focus. In response to questions regarding the com-
mercial scope of the bill, Sherman emphasized that many trusts were
desirable and an important source of America's wealth. Only the
"unlawful combination, tested by the rules of the common law and
human experience"5 were to be proscribed. The debators repeatedly
emphasized that only commercial or business combinations were among
those deemed unlawful.26
A religious organization exercising purely ecclesiastical duties27
in furtherance of its beliefs is not a commercial or business combina-
tion. Such a group seemingly would not be included within the Act.
During debate, Senator Sherman noted that "churches" would not be
considered a combination that would violate the prohibitions of the
torney General v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 ('1982). Very basically,
the trust concept involved the transfer of shares by stockholders to a single trustee
who would exercise complete managerial control. Stockholders were entitled to dividends
based upon their trust certificates. Unlike corporations, trusts did not require state
sanctions nor were they subject to state regulation and control.
25. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
26. In response to fears that the bill would proscribe the lawful monopoly
resulting from a patent, agricultural or labor organizations, Senator Sherman stated:
The bill [S. 1] as reported contains three or four simple proposi-
tions which relate only to contracts, combinations, agreements made with
a view and designed to carry out a certain purpose, which the laws of
all the States and of every civilized community declare to be unlawful.
It does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations
made to affect public opinion to advance the interests of a particular trade
or occupation. It does not interfere with the Farmers' Alliance at all,
because that is an association of farmers to advance their interests and
to improve the growth and manner of production of their crops and to
secure intelligent growth and to introduce new methods. No organizations
in this country can be more beneficial in their character than Farmers'
Alliances and farmers' associations. They are not business combinations.
They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc. They have no connec-
tions with them. And so the combinations of workingmen to promote their
interests, promote their welfare, and increase their pay if you please, to
get their fair share in the division of production, are not affected in the
slightest degree, nor can they be included in the words or intent of the
bill as now reported.
21 CONG. REc. 2562 (1890) (emphasis supplied).
27. "Ecclesiastical. Pertaining to anything belonging to or set apart for the
church, as distinguished from 'civil' or 'secular,' with regard to the world." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 459 (5th ed. 1979). The preparation, editing and distribution of
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 6
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bill.28 No one had directly challenged the lawfulness of a church
organization. Rather, Sherman's remarks were in response to fears
that the bill would condemn agricultural and labor organizations.
Sherman stressed that the thrust of the bill was to regulate only those
producing or selling articles in order to protect the consumer from
prohibitive prices for the necessities of life.29 Apparently labor,
agricultural, temperance, or church organizations were not to be
proscribed.
Although exchanges during debate cannot conclusively define the
parameters of the Act, they do provide an indication of congressional
intent. One can glean an affirmative intent to regulate business com-
petitors, not organizations motivated by social, moral, religious or
political concerns. During the House debates one representative
declared that no one seemed to understand the meaning of the bill,
referring to it as "experimental legislation" and "a blind legislation
to answer the popular demand that something . . . be done about
trusts.""0 Despite such statements expressly limiting the Act to the
control of trusts, the courts have broadly interpreted the Act in its
application to concrete situations." The courts have consistently read
the Act as a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
liturgical materials (i.e., texts used in the liturgical rites and prayer of the church)
would constitute an ecclesiastical duty or function. See e.g., Metropolitan Baptist Church
v. Younger, 48 Cal. App. 3d, 850, 858, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903 (1975):
Ecclesiastical matters ordinarily concern creeds and the proper mode of
exercising one's belief, considerations of faith, including questions of what
constitutes an essential of a church's faith, and matters of church discipline,
tenets and general policy. In such matters the state, and its courts, have
no legitimate concern or jurisdiction." (Citations omitted).
28. Sherman's remarks were made in speaking to an amendment which would
specifically exempt temperance societies from the bill:
I have no objections to the amendment, but I do not see any reason for
putting in temperance societies any more than churches or school houses
or any other kind of moral or educational association that may be organized.
Such an association is not in any sense a combination or arrangement
made to interfere with interstate commerce.
21 CONG. REC. 2658-59 (1890) (Emphasis supplied). The implication of Senator Sherman's
remarks are unclear. Although such an association or combination may not have been
"made" to interfere with interstate commerce, that is, their motive was not such, in
fact the effect would. For example, the temperance movement virtually curtailed the
legal interstate movement of liquor.
29. See 20 CONG. REC. 1458-59 (1889).
30. 21 CONG. REC. 4095 (1890).
31. E.g., the Court initially refused to exempt labor unions from the Sher-
man Act. As a result, Congress enacted the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. SS 17,
52 (1976), to immunize cetain labor activities. See also infra notes 81-100 and accom-
panying text.
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preserving free and unfettered competition."32 A religious organiza-
tion is not a competitor in the classic sense, but its actions can inhibit
competition. A literal reading of the Act would make an interference
with competition unlawful. But clearly the text of the Act was not
intended to delineate the full meaning of the statute. A religious
organization's liability for conduct restraining competition must be
determined, therefore, in light of the common law tradition referred
to during the debates.'
The Common Law Rule of Reason: A Mode of Antitrust Analysis
Despite the expansive wording of the Sherman Act, it has long
been settled that not every combination restraining trade falls within
its scope.' Though remarks made during the legislative debates sug-
gest that a religiously motivated boycott is not within the ambit of
the Act, ultimately, liability under the Act is a function of judicial
discretion. The courts must first determine if the Sherman Act ap-
plies in a given factual situation. If the Act applies, the court must
then assess the reasonableness of the anticompetitive conduct and
resultant restraint of trade. Congress intended that the common law
tradition would provide the necessary guidance for courts to give
shape to the statute's broad mandate." Unfortunately, the common
law can be as elusive and opaque as the Sherman Act itself.
One commentator has noted that the common law Senator Sher-
man saw as relevant to his act was an "artificial construct" devised
by selecting those cases which fit the "senator's own policy
prescriptions."' The senator's "prescription" for regulating combina-
tions and competition was undoubtedly intertwined with notions of
consumer welfare. 7 Using a consumer based standard, "religious" com-
binations which restrain trade should be subject to the same liability
as business combinations whose activities restrict competition. Yet
in determining liability, the judiciary has used the common law stan-
dard of reason as the prevailing mode of antitrust analysis."8 The rule
32. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. Standard Oil Co. v. United States 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 20 (1978).
37. 21 CONG. REC. 2,457 (1890).
38. Standard Oil, 211 U.S. at 60. The origin of the rule of reason is generally
attributed to the decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds:
[Ayll contracts, where there is a bare restraint of trade and no more, must
be void; but this is taking place only where the consideration is not shown
can be no reason why, in cases where the special matter appears so as
[Vol. 17
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of reason approach allows for "flexibility,"39 but it also leads to
uncertainity.
The Supreme Court's antitrust holdings have failed to articulate
a clear or consistent standard of liability. However, the following four-
step analysis may suggest a method for ascertaining the
reasonableness of the challenged conduct.
Step 1: Initially a determination must be made as to
reasonableness of the application of the Act itself. Where a constitu-
tional guarantee" or statutorially protected right 1 is present, liability
under the Act should be found unreasonable; that is, immunity ob-
tains or the actors are exempt from liability. Although there is a
significant difference between the concepts of "immunity" and "exemp-
tion," the Court has clouded the distinction by using these terms
interchangeably. 2 Exemption suggests that there may be situations
in which the courts will find liability despite the existence of a con-
stitutional or statutory right: the Act preempts. Immunity is
predicated upon a superior policy consideration such as an inviolable
constitutional guarantee: The Act cannot preempt.
Step 2: If the challenged conduct is not found to be immune
or exempt in Step 1, the reasonableness of the application of the Act
will be analyzed in terms of economic consequences.4" Here the
reasonableness or legality of the conduct is determined by asking
whether competition is promoted or supressed, "[tlhe inquiry [being]
confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions.""
The statutory policy embodied in the Act precludes considera-
tion of whether competition is good or bad. Hence, liability under the
to make it a reasonable and useful contract, it should not be good.
1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). But cf. King v. Norris, 2 Kenyon 300,
96 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1758) (reasonableness of restraint irrelevant).
39. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1977).
40. See infra notes 101-23.
41. See infra notes 81-100.
42. See, e.g., Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.
Ct. 835 (1982). In Community Communications the Court held that the ordinance at
issue, see infra note 78, did not "qualify" for the Parker state action exemption. In
his dissent, Justice Rehnquist challenged the Court's characterization of the Parker
doctrine as an "exemption," noting that the Court's holding in Parker was based on
a finding that state economic regulations were "immune" from the Sherman Act. Id.
at 845-50.
43. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'r, 435 U.S. at 690-91.
44. Id.
19831
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Sherman Act can be predicated upon purpose or effect alone, irrespec-
tive of purpose. Since 1897 the Supreme Court has held that wrongful
or unlawful purpose is not necessary to a finding of section one
liability. 5 A benign or other lawful purpose may be irrelevant to a
finding of the Sherman Act liability where the "direct, immediate,
and necessary effect" is to restrain trade unreasonably and, therefore,
unlawfully."' Proof that the combination or agreement was entered
into with intent or purpose to effect the restraint is unnecessary to
a finding of liability. Thus, a contract, combination or conspiracy
violates section one if it "eliminates," "hampers," "injures," "restricts,"
"restrains," "limits," "harms," "diminishes," "chills," or "clogs"47 com-
petition even though the parties' purpose is "neutral or benign."48
Liability can also be predicated upon purpose alone: the
unreasonableness of the restraint can be inferred from the evident
purpose. 9 An "otherwise reasonable trade arrangement must fall if
conceived to achieve forbidden ends. 50 Agreements with no
demonstrable impact may violate section one if entered into with the
purpose of restraining trade.
In short, at the Step 2 level, the courts use the rule of reason
to decide if the challenged conduct falls within the scope of the Act
because of its effect or potential effect on competition. If the pro-
competitive effects outweigh anticompetitive effects, the Act does not
apply."
Step 3: If the challenged conduct can be characterized as anti-
competitive at Step 2, a per se rule of illegality is used for those
agreements or practices, such as boycotts, which experience has shown
have a generally "pernicious," unreasonable effect on competition. 2
45. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The
Court struck down the defendants' rate-fixing scheme on the ground that the agree-
ment's "direct, immediate and necessary effect" was to restrain trade. Id. at 342.
46. Id.
47. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV.
1, 7 (1981-82).
48. Id.
49. United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
50. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622 (1953).
51. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
52. The per se doctrine was explained in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
365 U.S. 1 (1958):
[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 6
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Regardless of purpose or effect they are condemned by the Sherman
Act. If the extent of the anticompetitive effect is not so obvious, the
Court will use the rule of reason approach." The reasonableness of
the effect is viewed from an economic standpoint. The legality of the
conduct at this step turns upon 1) whether the conduct is governed
by a per se rule or the rule of reason; and 2) whether the conduct,
if tested by the rule of reason, is reasonable.'
Step 4: Finally, the Court has not found liability for an other-
wise anticompetitive restraint where the purpose is so extraordinary
as to "save" the conduct. Compelling circumstances unique to a specific
industry might save an otherwise unlawful restraint.5 5 However, the
excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act
more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investiga-
tion into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken.
Id. at 5.
Some of the commercial arrangements which have been held to be per se viola-
tions include price-fixing, division of markets, resale price maintenance, tying ar-
rangements, and group boycotts. For a comprehensive listing of cases where per se
liability has been found, see E. KINTER, supra note 22 at 57-59, n.224-31; L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 199-03, n.2-18 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(vertical market division not properly subject to the per se rule). "[Clompetitive economics
have social and political as well as economic advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced
from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks. . . . [Any] depar-
ture from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable effect." Id.
at 53, n.21 (citations omitted). See also Liebeler, Antitrust Law and the New Federal
Trade Commission, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 66 (1980-81); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
54. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
per se test is evidentiary in nature: once a particular practice has been characterized
as unreasonable, the plaintiff need only show evidence of an act or a conspiracy to
act which has been held to be illegal per se irrespective of the defendant's motive
or intent. Using the rule of reason the court would need to determine if the economic
pressure brought by the Church was legitimately geared to the Church's protection
of its liturgy rather than its survival in the marketplace of religious books. Even assum-
ing that the Church's activity is a genuine expression of the right to exercise freely,
the reasonableness of the tactics used must be assessed (i.e., a weighing of the nature
and extent of the antitrust violation with the religious goals sought to be implemented.)
55. See, e.g., Cement Mfr. Protective Ass'n v. U.S., 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (Due
to unique circumstances within the cement industry, the gathering and dissemination
of information by sellers to prevent the perpetration of fraud upon them held not
to be an unlawful restraint, despite a resultant uniformity of price). A narrow excep-
tion may also exist for professional associations where the restraint is predicated upon
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existence of "saving purpose" at Step 4 is unlikely. A compelling pur-
pose would most likely be reflected in protected rights, analyzed at
Step 1, which may preclude application of the Act.
Reasonableness is assessed on two planes: first, the
reasonableness of application of the Act itself, and secondly, if ap-
plicable, the reasonableness of the anticompetitive conduct.5' In the
case of a religiously motivated boycott, either reasonableness of ap-
plication or reasonableness of exemption is contingent upon first
amendment concerns. Application of the Act may constitute an
unreasonable interference with the free exercise of religion guarantee.
Conversely, immunity or exemption from the Act may be tantamount
to a violation of the establishement ban. Practical application of the
rule of reason has yielded immunity or exemption from antitrust
liability in certain areas. A review of these cases provides guidance
in analyzing the reasonableness of a religiously motivated boycott.
Judicially Created Immunity and Exemptions from the Sherman Act
Boycotts or concerted refusals to deal have been consistently con-
demned as violative of the antitrust laws, irrespective of the alleged
motive, intent or purpose.," These cases involved businessmen acting
(refusing to deal) in relationship to their business. The Court has,
however, recognized immunity from the Sherman Act when the actor
is not a businessman and the purpose is not commercial, irrespective
of effect.M A religiously motivated boycott would involve non-
businessmen acting in furtherance of non-commercial purpose.
In considering liability for non-commercial activity, it is necessary
to define non-commercial purpose. Professor Coons has set out an
an effort to control "unethical" practices. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). Though finding a fee schedule violated section one of the Sherman
Act, the Court noted a restraint operating upon a profession may be distinguishable
from a business: "The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could be properly viewed as a violation
of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently .. " Id. at 788, n.17.
But cf. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
The Court again found a section one violation based upon the anticompetitive effect
of the society's bid canon, noting that the "cautionary footnote" in Goldfarb was not
intended to create a "broad exemption under the Rule of Reason for learned profes-
sions." Id. at 696. See generally Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws,
50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 570 (1975).
56. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 9.
58. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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analytical framework for distinguishing relevant purposes. 59 The pur-
pose is "commercial" if the objective is profit and the actors are
businessmen. Non-commercial purpose can be economic or non-
economic. The purpose is "economic" if advancement of the group's
economic self-interest, that is, relating to production, distribution, and
consumption of goods and services, is the objective. A "non-economic"
purpose is one where the actors lack "substantial .. .material self-
interest."' Entrepreneurs, hired labor, and church groups, respectively,
are typical actors in the above enterprises. Despite the existence of
three separate categories, classifying a given purpose is often difficult.
For example, Professor Coons notes that an anti-Negro real estate
boycott could have an economic and non-economic purpose. Regardless,
identification of purpose seems necessary before exemption from liabili-
ty can even be contemplated.
Additionally, the status of the defendant seems important in
ascertaining liability. Status as a businessman tends to trigger liability;
therefore, non-business status must be computed in the calculus. As
Professor Coons notes, status and purpose are often inextricably inter-
twined; a particular purpose is essential to the recognition of a par-
ticular status.6 Immunity and judicially created antitrust exemptions
seem to hinge upon a finding of status and a correlative purpose which
are equal to or greater than the purpose or policy objective of the
antitrust laws: competition. Chief Justice Hughes stated that as a
charter of freedom, the Sherman Act had a generality and an adapt-
ability which characterizes constitutional provisions.2 Hence, any ex-
emption must be based upon a weighty, if not lofty, countervailing
policy consideration. Absent statutory exemption63 the Court has
established a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions." Those
59. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. L. REV.
705, 710-11 (1961-62).
60. Id. at 712-13; see also Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial
Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247, 248-49 (1970).
61. Coons, supra note 59, at 716.
62. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1932).
63. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. SS 291-92 (1976) (Capper-Volsted Act, agricultural
cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. SS 1011-1013 (1976) (McCarran-Ferguson Act, insurance); 49
U.S.C. S 5(b) (1976) (Reed-Bulwinkle Act, rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus);
15 U.S.C. S 1801 (1976) (newspaper joint operating agreements; 15 U.S.C. SS 17, 52
(1976) (Clayton Act, labor, agriculture and horticultural organizations); 29 U.S.C. SS
101-115 (1976) (Norris-LaGuardia Act, labor).
64. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Califor-
nia v. EPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
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cases where the Court has recognized immunity or exemption reflect
a merging of the status and purpose requirement. The state action,"5
non-statutory labor,66 and right to petition" cases all implicitly rely
upon a finding of non-commercial purpose coupled with a non-business
status which manifest a policy consideration of equal or greater force
to the antitrust laws. Analysis of these exemptions should assist in
ascertaining liability for a religiously motivated restraint.
The State Action Exemption:
The question whether the federal antitrust laws prohibit a state,
in the exercise of its sovereign powers, from imposing competitive
restraints was first addressed in Parker v. Brown.8 In Parker the
Court found that an anticompetitive agricultural marketing program
adopted by the State of California did not violate the Sherman Act.
The Court held that the act was intended to regulate "business com-
binations" and not to prohibit a state from imposing a restraint as
"an act of government."' 9 The declared purpose of the state regulatory
program, although intended to restrain competition, was to rectify
an allegedly serious local economic problem." Implicit in the Court's
holding was 1) a recognition of the status of the defendant-
constitutional sovereignty of the state under our dual system of
government,71 and 2) a deference to the purpose of the activity-the
economic health, safety and well-being of local communities."
The availability of this state action immunity has been severely
limited by the Court in subsequent cases. The "anticompetitive ac-
tivities . . .[must] be compelled by direction of the State acting as
a sovereign.17 3 Mere "state authorization, approval, encouragement,
or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust
immunity."7' Further, the Court has rejected ipso facto immunity for
65. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
67. See infira notes 101-23 and accompanying text.
68. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
69. Id. at 350-52.
70. The regulatory program was necessary to curtail "the evils attending the
production and marketing of raisins ... [which] present a problem local in character
and urgently demanding state action for the economic protection of those engaged
in one of its [California's] important industries." Id. at 363.
71. Id. at 351.
72. Id. at 362.
73. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). See supra note 55.
74. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976) (public utilities'
lightbulb dissemination program not immune from antitrust liability despite provision
for the program in the state-operated tariff). But cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
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subordinate state governmental bodies."5 Immunity is recognized only
where the anticompetitive restraints engaged in by state municipalities
or subdivisions are "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed""6
as state policy. Finally, the activity must be actively supervised by
the state.77 The Court recently denied a municipality state action im-
munity even though active state supervision of a clearly articulated
state policy would contravene the Colorado Constitution's Home Rule
provision. Quite simply, immunity from liability obtains only when
the state as sovereign performs a governmental act.
Using the four step analysis79 it is determined at step 1 that a
state's anticompetitive regulation cannot reasonably be found unlawful
under the Sherman Act in light of federalism and comity concerns."
Although the language of Sherman Act prohibits all anticompetitive
practices, the Court has held it cannot be, nor does the legislative
history suggest it should be, interpreted to impinge upon the con-
stitutional sovereignty of the states. A fortiori religiously motivated
conduct, also protected by the Constitution, should not be within the
realm of the antitrust laws.
The Labor Exemption:
Though constitutionally unprotected, the "labor" status and a cor-
relative non-commercial, economic purpose present another line of
special cases delimiting the scope of the Sherman Act. Laborers
classically combine together for the purpose of bettering their wages,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (restraint imposed on advertising of legal services exempt from
Sherman Act claims [though violative of first amendment] as the restraint was an
affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court).
75. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (exemption
unavailable to city owned and operated utility unless acting pursuant to affirmative
state policy).
76. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 105 (1980) (California resale price maintenance system, affecting all wine producers
and wholesalers within the state, not entitled to exemption).
77. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410; Bates, 43.3 U.S. at 359-60; California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 445 U.S. at 105.
78. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982) (city's moratorium ordinance restricting cable television business expansion pend-
ing enactment of city's model ordinance subject to antitrust liability). See supra note 42.
79. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
80. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. Accord
"Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference
of the State that created them." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13 (citation omitted).
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hours, and working conditions."' As such, the purpose of the labor
combination is not to supplant the businessman enterpreneur. The rela-
tionship is "symbiotic rather than competitive."82 Regardless of pur-
pose, labor boycotts, both primary and secondary,' can effect severe
competitive restraints, ostensibly in violation of the antitrust laws.
Initially, the Court held the Sherman Act fully applicable to labor
unions.' In the Danbury Hatters case85 the Court noted the lack of
any distinction between classes in the Sherman Act, which covers
"every" contract or combination in restraint of trade. The Court fur-
ther noted the failure of congressional attempts to legislatively ex-
empt labor organizations from the Act.88 Under such a reading of the
Act the union was subject to liability for its national consumer boycott
of the plaintiff's hats. Congress reacted by providing protection for
labor in the Clayton Act in 1914,87 but the Court read this provision
narrowly and the Sherman Act broadly and continued to apply anti-
trust sanctions against labor.8
The development of modern Supreme Court antitrust principles
in relation to labor began in 1940 with Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader."
Members of a labor union, bent on unionizing a factory, had forcibly
seized the plant in violation of civil and criminal laws of the state.
For over six weeks the union held the plant, totally disrupting business
and extensively damaging property and equipment. The Court found
no antitrust liability as the local labor union had been furthering its
organizational goals in the labor market rather than acting on behalf
of an employer to suppress competition. Regardless of the intended
81. See generally Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183,
1185-92 (1980).
82. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. L. REV.
705, 730 (1961-62).
83. A union strike or work stoppage would be a typical primary boycott. When
a union enlists the aid of a secondary employer or the public in an attempt to coerce
the primary employer to acquiesce to the union's demands, they affect a secondary
boycott. See generally Leslie, supra note 81.
84. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (The "Danbury Hatters").
85. Id.
86. Beginning in 1908, "[tlhe records of Congress show that several efforts
were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the
operation of the Act and that all these efforts failed, so that the act remained as
we have it before us." Id. at 301.
87. 15 U.S.C. SS 17, 26 (1976).
88. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
89. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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effect, the touchstone of liability for businessmen, 90 labor was
immunized by its status and purpose.
In United States v. Hutcheson9' the Court found exemption from
the antitrust laws in light of the Clayton Act92 and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act93 "so long as [the] union acts in its self-interest and
does not combine with non-labor groups."' A statutorily defined status
and purpose, evincing a countervailing policy objective, precluded im-
position of antitrust liability.
Even where a statutory exemption is not afforded, the courts
can refuse to find liability on the basis of the status and purpose.
In Allied International v. International Longshoremen's5 the circuit
court found the ILA's refusal to load or unload cargo on ships en
route to or from the Soviet Union, in protest of the Soviet armed
forces' invasion of Afghanistan, not immunized by statute from the
operation of the antitrust laws. Such a "political dispute" did not relate
to the statutorily protected legitimate union interest in better wages,
hours, or conditions.' Despite the lack of statutory exemption the court
found no Sherman Act liability as the purpose of the boycott was
"not the sort of evil at which the Sherman Act was aimed. 97
Citing to Apex for the pivotal commercial/non-commercial dis-
tinction, the court noted in sweeping language that it would be a rare
case, absent a specific anti-competitive object or collaboration with
non-labor groups, where labors' concerted refusal to work would violate
antitrust laws.99 Allied seemingly stretches the labor status-purpose
exemption to the limit, for unlike Apex where the victim's capitula-
tion to the union demands would have the effect of removing the
restraint, the ILA's purpose was to suspend all trade with the Rus-
sians. This type of secondary boycott (the plaintiff being a neutral
victim), the purpose of which was to eliminate competition, would
90. Compare Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600 (1914) (retailer association's boycott of manufacturers selling directly to
customers held violation though restraint left manufacturers free to sell to retailers)
with Apex, 310 U.S. 469 (union association's restraint not violation even though closure
of plant ended sales to everyone). See also supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
91. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
92. 15 U.S.C. S 17 (1976).
93. 29 U.S.C. SS 101-15 (1976).
94. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at,232.
95. 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds 102 S. Ct. 1656 (1982).
96. Id. at 1380.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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clearly be a Sherman Act violation if engaged in by a business group.
It is worth noting that the status of the actors' here had a dual aspect:
the actors were both laborers and political advocates. Again, as in
the state action cases, there is judicial deference to values other than,
and sometimes inconsistent with, those of an unrestricted market."9
Where antitrust regulation would trench heavily on a countervailing
policy of national importance, the group boycott, regardless of effects
upon competition, is sanctioned.
Though a restraint effected by a labor monopoly can be as anti-
competitive as those effected by a business monopoly, application of
the Act may not be appropriate. If the union's purpose is self-interest,
the restraint is reasonable. The right of workers to organize and to
engage in concerted activities in furtherance of unionization goals,
though often anticompetitive in effect, is legislatively protected.' ° The
right of the religious to organize, free from governmental interference,
is constitutionally protected. Where a religious organization acts in
its self-interest in furtherance of its beliefs, antitrust liability should
not attach. Under an Apex commercial/non-commercial test, any
restraint of trade resulting from a religiously motivated purpose should
be reasonable.
The issue addressed in the labor and state action cases is the
primary issue addressed in all antitrust cases: are there policy con-
siderations which transcend the protection of competition? These cases
indicate that there are areas of our economic and political life to which
antitrust objectives must yield. The state action cases reflect solicitude
for the constitutional status afforded state governments. The labor
cases reflect a deference to labor contingent upon a non-commercial
purpose. Further policy considerations which transcend the importance
of competition exist in first amendment rights.
The First Amendment Right to Petition Exemption:
In a trilogy of cases the Court has recognized the broadest of
all immunities from antitrust liability based upon the first amdend-
ment right to petition.1 Beginning with Noerr,0 2 and following with
99. Coons, supra note 82, at 742.
100. In 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act),
29 U.S.C. 5 157-69 (1976), which protects the rights of workers to organize. Supplemented
by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. S 141-88 (1976), and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29
U.S.C. S 153, 158-60, 164, 186-87, 401-531 (1976), the Wagner Act establishes a na-
tional labor policy that permits, and even encourages, unionization.
101. See supra note 7.
102. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
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Pennington'° and California Motor Transport,"° the Supreme Court
has held that concerted efforts by competitors seeking to influence
governmental officials to take action that injures their rivals does not
violate the antitrust laws. The Court in Noerr and Pennington found
such immunity as a matter of statutory construction 1 5 in order to avoid
first amendment questions. 6 The holding in California Motor
Transport made it explicit that the Constitution itself precludes im-
position of liability for concerted efforts to influence any governmental
official: legislative, judicial, or administrative. 7 This immunity in-
sulates those who seek anticompetitive ends via legislative enactment,
executive veto, agency licensing, or judicial determination. The sweep-
ing nature of the Noerr doctrine was summed up by Mr. Justice White,
writing in Pennington: "Joint efforts to influence public officials do
not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate com-
petition" and even though the conduct may be "part of a broader
scheme violative of the Sherman Act."'10 8
Under the status-purpose analysis suggested, the actors are no
longer business competitors but political advocates seeking to inform
the government of their wishes. Their purpose is concededly anti-
competitive: enhancement of competitive advantage. But the vehicle
for realization of this purpose, governmental action, immunizes this
conduct from antitrust liability. An objective to influence government
to affect marketplace goals is protected by the first amendment.0 9
103. United Mine Worker v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
104. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
105. "We accept, as the starting point for our consideration of the case, the
same basic construction of the Sherman Act adopted by the courts below-that no
violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage
or enforcement of laws .. " Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135.
106. [Of at least equal significance, such a construction of the Sherman
Act [proscribing political activity having an anticompetitive effect] would
raise important constitutional questions. The right to petition is one of
the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.
Id. at 137-38.
107. We conclude that it would be destructive of the rights of associa-
tion and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not,
without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of
state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points
of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interest vis-
a-vis their competitors.
California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 510-11.
108. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
109. "[T]o hold that ... people cannot freely inform the government of their
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity,
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A representative form of government relies upon citizen input regard-
ing needs and grievances. The prosecution of individuals engaged in
such activity would chill the free interchange of ideas between the
governed and the governing.11 Thus, an anticompetitive purpose is
legally irrelevant when the objective is the passage or enforcement
of certain laws."'
The Court has imposed a limit on the immunity afforded political
activity in the antitrust context. The genesis of the "sham" exception
to first amendment immunity was the ruling in Noerr. The Court
stated that where a publicity campaign to influence governmental ac-
tion was a "mere sham to cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor ... application of the
Sherman Act would be justified." ' 2 The Court elaborated upon the
scope of the sham exception in California Motor Transport. Though
holding that attempts to influence administrative or judicial officials
were protected, the Court cited practices or conduct which would not
be immune, such as perjury of witnesses, conspiracy with a licensing
authority, or bribery of a public official."' The fundamendal question
in cases involving the sham exception is purpose. ' If the defendants'
true purpose is to injure competitors directly rather than influence
government action, immunity predicated upon first amendment rights
will fail.1 5 But if the defendants' efforts are genuinely aimed at in-
but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis in the legislative history
of the Act." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 138-40.
112. Id. at 144.
113. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512-13. The Court in California Motor
Transp. concluded that the defendants had formed "[a] combination of entrepreneurs
to harass and deter their competitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the
agencies and courts, to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and purposeful activity,"
id. at 515, and therefore were within the sham exception.
114. Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, Inc., 850 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978) (defendants'
opposition to the reopening of old airport not intended to injure plaintiff directly;
therefore, not a basis for the sham exception).
115. This direct-indirect distinction was alluded to by the Court in Fashion
Originator's Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 456 (1941). The Guild, composed of
designers and manufacturers of women's clothing and fashion textiles, entered into
agreements to boycott and refused to sell to retailers who sold garments copied by
non-member manufacturers from exclusive designs put out by Guild members. The
Guild devised elaborate trial and appellate procedures to weed out "style pirates"
and enforce their boycott. The Court held the combination not only monopolistic, but
"an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint
of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and
punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the power of the national legislature
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fluencing governmental action or policy which itself inflicts injury on
a rival, the defendant is immune from the antitrust laws.11
6
By analogy to the right to petition cases, a religiously motivated
boycott would be immune from the antitrust laws. Immunity, based
upon the first amendment guarantee, should be afforded as long as
the actor's true purpose is the exercise of religious belief and not
a sham cover for a purpose to directly interfere with a competitive
rival. An indirect anticompetitive effect would be legally irrelevant
where the exercise of a first amendment right is at stake.'
The right to petition immunity was given its broadest reading
in Missouri v. NOW."8 In NOW the National Organization for Women
initiated state convention boycotts hoping such economic coercion
would convince state legislators to support passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment. Although the purpose of the boycott was ratification of
the constitutional amendment, NOW's purpose was to directly restrain
trade. In Noerr, the Court held a direct restraint of competition
violative of the Sherman Act."9 The NOW court discarded the direct/in-
direct distinction and held that antitrust liability was predicated upon
a finding of "commercial competitors" not "political opponents."'2
NOW's objectives were political, not marketplace goals; consequently,
they were beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.'2'
NOW expands considerably the immunity afforded in Noerr. The
combination in Noerr sought passage of legislation that would restrain
trade. In NOW a boycott which itself restrained trade was utilized
to encourage ratification of the ERA. Despite direct commercial in-
jury to the convention industry, the actors' status as political activists
and their purpose to coerce ratification of ERA immunized them from
and violates the statute.' " Id. at 465. The Court suggested that the defendants could
have sought relief from the tortious conduct of the "style pirates" in state court, but
could not directly restrain the purportedly illegal competition.
116. See, e.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
177. The direct/indirect anticompetitive effect distinction is somewhat
misleading. Advocates of legislative change or those conducting a religiously motivated
boycott may "intend" to directly affect competition. Their overriding purpose, however,
would be a political or religious one (i.e., motive), and hence, the resultant interference
with competition is deemed indirect. The direct/indirect distinction was abandoned by
the court in Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
118. Id.
119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
120. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1311-12.
121. Id.
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antitrust liability on the basis of their first amendment rights. 2' The
court based its holding on its reading of the Sherman Act's legislative
history. The court further noted the Act could not be applicable to
politically motivated conduct without impinging upon first amendment
rights.'23
The NOW holding has far-reaching implications for Sherman Act
liability when the first amendment right to petition is at issue. The
holding cannot be generalized, however, to all first amendment rights.
The religion clause of the first amendment is double-edged: the govern-
ment can neither prohibit nor promote religion. Imposing liability for
the anticompetitive effects of a religiously motivated boycott might
violate the free exercise guarantee. But immunity from the Sherman
Act, despite direct, intentional anticompetitive effects, could violate
the establishment clause. 24 The problem is further complicated by the
need to define or identify religious as opposed to non-religious motives.
A blanket immunity for religiously motivated conduct would
necessarily include expressions of traditional religious beliefs, fad-
faiths, as well as deeply felt and sincerely held atheistic beliefs. Any
exemption of this magnitude would significantly undermine the anti-
trust laws.
THE REASONABLENESS OF A RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED BOYCOTT
The antitrust laws have not, as yet, been applied against a
religious organization.'25 A recent suit,'26 brought by the owner of a
religious publishing house to pursue a claim that the National Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops and other church officials conspired in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act to prevent the publisher from selling an
English translation of the Latin Liturgia Horum, compels the ques-
tion of the antitrust laws' scope. The district court dismissed the suit,
122. Chief Judge Gibson states in his dissent that the majority's holding was
an "over-broad interpretation of Noerr," id. at 1319; that the factual distinctions (direct
versus indirect restraint) mandated a "comprehensive balancing of the important govern-
mental interest in preserving the free enterprise system with the interest of people
to use this particular method of influencing legislation," id. at 1324. See Bird, supra
note 13, in which the author argues that noncommercial boycotts should be per se
violations under the Sherman Act. The district court addressed and rejected Bird's
theory, failing to see how a per se rule would adequately protect the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of association and the right to petition. Missouri v. NOW, 467
F. Supp. 289, 305 n.32 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
123. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1302-09.
124. See infra note 167.
125. Costello v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (1981).
126. Id.
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holding that the efforts of the Catholic officials to maintain the integ-
rity of their liturgy by preventing the dissemination of an unauthorized
and unapproved liturgical text were in furtherance of their ec-
clesiastical duties. The court found the antitrust law applicable "sole-
ly within a commercial competitive framework.""'2 Any anticompetitive
effect from the religious boycott was legally irrelevant.
The circuit court, however, overturned the lower court's decision,
finding "no absolute exemption from the antitrust laws for economic
pressure tactics ... that are religiously motivated."'28 Although noting
motivation to be an important consideration, the court held good
motive cannot immunize action."9 On remand, the trial court must
balance the first amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion
and the general communities' interest in conducting commerce free
of anticompetitive arrangements.'30
The circuit court rejected immunity at step 1 because of the
tension between the free exercise clause and establishment ban. On
remand the district court must determine the reasonableness of
religiously motivated boycotts. Using a rule of reason standard, the
court must review common law precedents where religiously motivated
conduct has occasioned a restraint of trade.'3' Any conclusion as to
liability must be made with two factors in mind. First, the
reasonableness of the restraint must be viewed in light of the com-
pelling public policy embodied in the Sherman Act. Secondly, justifi-
cation of a religiously motivated anticompetitive effect cannot violate
the establishment ban. Furthermore, the weighing of antitrust costs
against religious benefits from concerted activities cannot itself run
afoul of the ban against governmental entanglement in religious
affairs."2
127. Costello v. Rotelle, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,499, at 76,664 (D.D.C.
Aug. 22, 1980).
128. Costello, 670 F.2d at 1049.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. As noted previously, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text, the
legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates the common law was to provide the
standard for ascertaining which business practices or combinations were unlawful under
the Sherman Act. Accordingly, consideration of those cases in which religiously
motivated action has affected a restraint of trade should guide the antitrust analysis.
132. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (excessive state involvement with religious affairs unconstitutional; accommoda-
tion of the establishment and free exercise clauses requires adherence to a policy of
neutrality).
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Common Law Precedents for Religiously Motivated Restraints of Trade
The judiciary has shown considerable deference to religious
groups whose actions have resulted in anticompetitive effects. An
otherwise actionable common law restraint of trade has been justified
if the defendant has acted with the purpose of protecting the spiritual
well-being of its church. In Krueger Publishing Co. v. Messmer,3 ' a
1916 Wisconsin decision, the court found no liability for a religiously
motivated boycott. In Krueger most of the Catholic bishops of the state
were joined as defendants as a result of their boycott of the plain-
tiff's newspaper. The plaintiff sued for injury resulting from a pastoral
letter circulated and read in all of the churches of the dioceses de-
scribing the plaintiff's newspaper as injurious to faith and strongly
proscribing its reading or possession.134 Noting that the fundamental
purpose of the boycott was to preserve the spiritual well-being of the
church members, the court held any incidental interference with the
plaintiff's business was "daumnum absque injuria." '35 But the court
did add that it might have found otherwise if the church had purpose-
fully interfered with the plaintiff's business with respect to something
that ordinarily could not affect the faith of its members." The decision
implies a balancing of first amendment religion guarantees with
freedom of trade.
The same result was reached in a secondary boycott case in-
volving religious leaders as defendants. In Watch Tower Bible & Tract
133. 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916).
134. The following is the portion of the pastoral letter complained of:
Obedient to this apostolic command we hereby solemnly condemn
the said Kuryer Polski, published in the city of Milwaukee, and the Dzien-
nik Narodowy, published in Chicago, as publications greatly injurious to
Catholic faith and discipline and falling under the rules and prohibitions
of the Roman Index. Therefore, should any Catholics still dare in the face
of this solemn warning to read or keep or subscribe to or write for the
said Kuryer Polski and Dziennik Narodowy, as long as these papers con-
tinue their present course and attitude in ecclesiastical affairs, a matter
to be decided by ourselves, let them know that they commit a grievous
sin before God and the Church. Should any such Catholic dare to go to
confession and communion without confessing or telling to the priest that
they still read or keep or subscribe to the papers mentioned, let them
understand that by such confession and communion they commit a horri-
ble sacrilege. This solemn warning will also hold good in case that the
aforementioned papers should in future be conducted under changed names
though still in the same anti-Catholic spirit.
Id. at __, 156 N.W. at 949.
135. "Harm without injury." Id.
136. Id.
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Society v. Dougherty,7 the Catholic clergy organized protests threaten-
ing to boycott a department store which sponsored a radio broadcast
found offensive by the church. As a result the station cancelled the
plaintiff's contract and he sued. In a brief opinion the court held the
defendants' action was legitimate as they were church leaders whose
purpose was to protest attacks on the church.
In Swan v. First Church of Christ Scientist's8 the court dismissed
an author's claim against the church arising out of the church's dis-
approval of his book on the Christian Science faith.13 9 The court held
the plaintiff's enterprise and that of the church had little or no
resemblance to the activities recognized as unlawful restraints of
trade.4 ° Furthermore, the church's right to select its own ministers,
advocates, authors and sacred writings was "absolute" as protected
by the first amendment. Swan closely resembles Costello.' In both
cases the church attempted to preserve the doctrinal integrity of its
beliefs by boycotting the plaintiff's publication. It is uncertain whether
the organizational tie between the Christian Science Church and its
branches and reading rooms, absent in Costello,'2 is significant. If
immunity from liability is predicated upon the non-commercial,
religious purpose of the boycott, and any resulting interference with
the plaintiff's business is irrelevant, the relationship between the par-
ties should equally be irrelevant. The reasonableness of the restraint
is a function of purpose, not effect.
One court has found liability based upon effect, irrespective of
137. 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940).
138. 225 F.2d 745 (1955).
139. The Church had notified its branch churches and Christian Science reading
rooms not to purchase, acquire or sell the plaintiff's book.
140. Id. at 751.
141. Costello v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
142. The Catholic officials in Costello sent a memorandum to various indepen-
dent retailers requesting they not purchase the accused book for resale. The memo
did not explicitly threaten reprisals for rejecting the request, nor did it advocate a
complete boycott of the plaintiffs other merchandise. In pertinent part, the letter from
Father Rotelle to the retail distributors read:
Costello Publishing Company has circulated a flyer with inaccurate and
misleadinginformation .... They are importing this book from Ireland
into this country without the authorization of the local hierarchy of that
country .... We have kindly asked the publishing firm in question not
to distribute the book, but they insist on going against the decisive vote
of the episcopal conference.
Brief of Appellants at 27, Costello v. Rotelle, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64, 352 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 10, 1981). In Swan the church officials expressly forbade their own branches
and reading rooms to acquire, purchase, or sell the plaintiffs book.
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a religious purpose. In Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church,' the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a lower court's dismissal
of a suit against the church for interference with business relations.
The plaintiff, a member of the church, alleged that after his excom-
munication his business was in a state of collapse because of the
church's practice of "shunning."'4 The court held the shunning prac-
tices of the church might constitute an unreasonable interference with
areas of paramount state concern such as business and commerce. The
free exercise of religion was not an absolute defense where overt acts,
though prompted by religious beliefs or principles, posed a substan-
tial threat to public safety, peace or order."5 The Bear court did not
address the Swan case decided by it thrity-five years before, making
unclear the relative importance of purpose and effect in establishing
liability. Swan held religious purpose alone justifies non-imposition of
liability. Bear suggests religious purpose will immunize anticompetitive
conduct only within reasonable bounds. The test of reasonableness
in Bear was that articulated by the Supreme Court in judging all free
exercise claims.
The Reasonableness of Free Exercise Claims
In weighing free exercise claims against secular regulations the
Court has adopted a "balancing approach."""6 Initially the Court held
that the free exercise clause made only belief inviolate.' 7 Religiously
motivated action was held subject to the police power of the state
to the same extent as other, non-religiously motivated action would
be."' The Court narrowly read the free exercise clause as depriving
Congress of all legislative power over mere opinion, but free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
143. 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
144. "Shunning," as practiced by the church, involved total boycotting of the
plaintiff by other members of the church, including his wife and children, under pain
that they themselves be excommunicated and shunned. Id. at __, 341 A.2d at 106.
145. Id. at __, 341 A.2d at 107.
146. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See generally R. MORGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1972); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, Doc-
trinal Development, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Con-
stitution: The Religion Clause of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL.
L. REV. 3 (1978-79).
147. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1898) (the Court upheld a convic-
tion under a criminal statute proscribing polygamy despite defendant's contention that
polygamy was commanded by the religious doctrine to which he subscribed and thereby
protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment).
148. Id. at 164.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss3/6
19831 SHERMAN ACT LIABILITY
order. "9 The Court has since retreated from this belief-act distinction.' 5'
However, its behavior in what it labels freedom of religion cases has
been described by one commentator as comparable to the ancient
prerogative of dispensation pursuant to which the Crown could exempt
individuals from conforming to the laws of Parliment, especially for
reasons of religious belief15" '
Claims for religious-based exemptions have been made against
a wide variety of laws, including driver's license photograph
requirements,' 52 compulsory education requirements," tax laws,5'4
unemployment insurance rules,'5 narcotic statutes, 6 civil rights
statutes,'57 labor laws,'58 and snake handling prohibitions. 9 The Court
has afforded protection for religious actions, as well as beliefs, but
a compelling state interest will still justify imposition of a burden
149. The Court found the statutory prohibition of polygamy not only compell-
ing but vital to the very existence of a democratic society. The Court made reference
to sociological studies indicating the practice of polygamy ultimately led to an autocratic
society. Id. at 165-66.
150. See infra notes 152-59.
151. Kurland, supra note 146, at 17.
152. E.g., Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 593 P.2d 1363, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer,
Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978).
153. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis.
2d 407, 275 N.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1978).
154. E.g., United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm. 419 U.S. 7 (1974)
(withholding tax); Jaggard v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 913 (1979) (self-employment tax).
155. E.g., Sherbert f. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 391
N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979), rev'd, S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
156. E.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal Rptr. 69 (1964)
(peyote); Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 48 (1980) (marijuana).
157. E.g., Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (claim that private school's racial discrimination on
religious grounds was protected from civil rights action); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson,
396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), affd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (similar claim against
federal funding cutoff).
158. E.g., Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1977), affd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (free exercise challenge to NLRB jurisdiction over lay
teachers in parochial schools).
159. E.g., State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub
nom, Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) (denying religious defense to municipal
ordinance prohibiting handling of venomous and poisonous reptiles as to endanger public
health, safety, and welfare); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (upholding, and justifying as abatement of public
nuisance, injunction against snake handling by members of religious group).
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upon the exercise of religion.' Though the case holdings seem
inconsistent, 6 ' a rough composite test has emerged for balancing
religious acts against secular regulations.
In considering free exercise claims a court must first determine
if the government regulation creates a burden on the exercise of the
plaintiff's religion,'' assuming the belief espoused or acted upon is
considered "religious"'' and sincerely held by the person asserting
the infringement. If a burden is found, the government must establish
an interest of "sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the free exercise clause."'' The secular value under-
lying the regulation must be of the "highest order" and "overbalance"
legitimate free exercise claims. 6 s The impact of an exemption on the
regulatory scheme and the availability of a less restrictive alternative
are also considered.66
In weighing the interests, the court's assessment of the govern-
mental interest appears to be the critical element, especially in light
of the ever-changing and expanding concept of religion. A court must
weigh the importance of the secular value involved, the proximity and
necessity for the regulatory means to achieve it, and the cost of a
160. United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982) (policies embodied in the Social
Security and unemployment tax systems a compelling state interest which justified
imposition of burden on exercise of Amish religion whose belief is paying taxes is a sin).
161. The result of the Court's balancing reveals that Mormons may be pro-
secuted for polygamy although it was mandated by their religion. Reynolds, 98 U.S.
145. On the other hand, the Amish may be exempted from compulsory education laws.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. Adverse economic effects on seventh-day observers resulting from
the state's requirement of absention from business affairs on Sunday are not inva-
sions of religious freedom. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). But adverse economic
effects on seventh-day observers from unemployment compensation laws requiring
availability for employment are invasions of religious liberty. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
Most recently the Court has ruled that members of the Old Order Amish Church who
operate businesses must pay the Social Security and unemployment taxes required
of employers, despite their religious belief that paying taxes is a sin. United States
v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
162. "lIlt is necessary in a free exercise case to show the coercive effect of
the enactment as it operates against ... the practice of religion." School Dist. of Ab-
ington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
163. The Court has significantly broadened the definition of religion as well
as the scope of religious belief. Compare Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890)
(to call advocacy of polygamy "a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of
mankind") with United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (unusual religious
beliefs are not less worthy of protection).
164. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
165. Id. at 215.
166. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
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limited exemption for religious reasons. In the case of an economic
interest the court must also consider the degree to which exemption
would violate the non-establishment principles. If exemption does not
merely relieve the religious practitioner from a burden on free ex-
ercise, but in essence becomes a preference advancing a particular
religion or even religion in general, the exemption must be denied.167
The Probable Outcome of Costello v. Rotelle'll
The Catholic defendants in the Costello case maintan that any
application of the antitrust laws to their actions would deprive them
of their first amendment right to freely exercise their religion. They
argued that their actions had no commercially competitive motive and
therefore were not proscribed by the Sherman Act, regardless of in-
cidental anticompetitive effect. '69 In support of this argument the defen-
dants relied upon Parker, Noerr, and Allied International.1 7 1 In each
case the court concluded that the defendants' actions were not sub-
ject to the Sherman Act. The court based its decisions not on a literal
reading of the Act but from the purpose, the subject matter, the con-
text, and the legislative history of the statute.7 ' It should follow that
the existence of a non-commercial, religious purpose coupled with a
non-business status, manifesting a policy consideration of equal or
greater force than the antitrust laws,"' should mean the Sherman Act
does not apply. Since the Church defendants are not commercial
businessmen engaged in a traditional manufacturing enterprise, they
should not be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
If, under a Parker or Noerr rationale, the Sherman Act proscribes
167. The broadest reading given the establishment clause would outlaw all aids
to religion. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). The narrowest reading
would outlaw state action which tended to confer preferential benefits on particular
sects or members of particular sects. See C. ANTREAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS,
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 10-29 (1964).
168. See supra note 10. See also supra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.
169. Brief for Appellee at 17, Costello v. Rotelle, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,352, 74,633 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 10, 1981).
170. See supra notes 11-13.
171. Brief for Appellee at 19.
172. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (constitutionality of a state pro-
gram making textbooks available to pupils in parochial schools upheld), Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote:
[W]e are a religious people. . . . We make room for as wide a variety
of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. . .
• When the state encourages religion ... it follows the best of our tradi-
tions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accom-
modates the public service to their spiritual needs.
Id. at 313-14.
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only commercially motivated conduct by businessmen, direct injury
to Costello and financial gain"3 to the Church, as a result of the
boycott, should be irrelevant. The protected nature of the religious
activity, regardless of possible underlying motives and actual effect,
should preclude application of the antitrust laws. The basis for the
Court's holding in Noerr was the nature of the railroad's publicity
campaign as a form of protected expression."' Similarly, in Parker,
the state as sovereign was not subject to liability."5 Immunity from
the Sherman Act was afforded irrespective of competitive injury. This
result, a finding that the Act was inapplicable, was reached based
upon the statutory construction of the Sherman Act, its legislative
history, and constitutional considerations.
Status and purpose were constitutionally protected in Noerr and
Parker. The church defendants argue that they are similarly protected.
But the Supreme Court has never held that the free exercise clause
protects all religious acts or conduct. Only belief is held inviolate. The
church defendants contend that immunity is predicated not upon the
religious motivation but on the lack of a commercial motivation. Defin-
ing religion and weighing the belief-act distinction would be necessary
only to the extent necessary to prove a non-commercial motive. Such
a narrow reading of the Sherman Act would significantly diminish
its importance and effect, for there is no limit to the range of pur-
poses a group might characterize as religious to promote their own
competitive interests.
The Sherman Act is presumed applicable to all anticompetitive
conduct except that constitutionally protected. Any exemption for
religiously motivated conduct would, therefore, be contingent upon
a finding of constitutional protection for the free exercise claim. Free
exercise can be burdened where a governmental interest of the highest
order overbalances the claim.
The Sherman Act has been characterized as an act of constitu-
tional proportions.'76 Protection and promotion of competition in our
free enterprise system is undoubtedly a compelling interest. The ques-
tion then becomes whether the exercise of belief to be regulated by
the antitrust laws poses a substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order. Only the "gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
173. See infra note 180.
174. See supra notes 101-23 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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give occasion for permissible limitation" of religious practices. 77 The
commercial harm to Costello must be found to be tantamount to a
threat to public safety, peace or order.
In light of the Court's reluctance to find implied exemptions from
the antitrust laws'78 and its willingness to limit religious conduct when
an overriding interest is at stake, absolute immunity for a religiously
motivated boycott seems implausible. At best, the religious nature
of the boycott may provide a defense'79 to the Sherman Act liability.
The success of a first amendment defense will depend upon whether
the economic pressure tactics used by the church were legitimately
geared to the Church's protection of the liturgy or its survival in the
marketplace of books.'' Even assuming the Church's activity was a
legitimate expression of religious belief, the general community's in-
terest in conducting commerce free of anticompetitive arrangements
may justify a denial of their free exercise claim. This is true especially
where less drastic means are available to the group.' Most impor-
tantly, the balance struck between the Sherman Act and the free ex-
ercise of religion cannot significantly encourage or discourage religious
life.
CONCLUSION
An intent to infringe upon the first amendment free exercise
of religion by the Sherman Act should not lightly be imputed to
Congress.8 ' Thus, the Sherman Act canhot mean precisely what it
says. "[A]ll combinations in restraint of trade" must primarily refer
to commercially motivated and not politically, socially, or religiously
177. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
178. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (ex-
emptions "given reluctantly and only after there has been a clear showing of over-
riding need"). Id. at 138 n.34.
179. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
180. As the copyright holder for approved, authorized liturgical texts, the
Catholic Church officials receive royalties from their sale. If the boycott of the
unauthorized text was to enhance the sales of the books from which they received
royalties, rather than merely to preserve the integrity of the liturgy, their purpose
is no longer religious but commercial (profit inspired).
181. The church officials could have communicated directly with their members
admonishing the acquisition or purchase of the unauthorized, unapproved texts, rather
than provoking a retail boycott of the publisher's text.
182. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (congressional purpose to
nullify or restrain a state's officers or agents not lightly to be imputed to Congress);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1960) (intent to invade the right to petition not lightly to be imputed to Congress).
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motivated groups. The legislative history of the Act evinces a clear
intent to prohibit commercial combinations whose conduct restains
trade. Whether Congress intended a non-commercial status and pur-
pose to shield an actor from liability is less clear. Congress left to
the judiciary the task of balancing policy conflicts under the Sher-
man Act.
In according antitrust exemptions the Court has considered the
status and purpose of the actor in light of constitutional guarantees
or compelling policy considerations. Where imposition of antitrust
liability impermissibly burdens or virtually prohibits the protected
conduct, the antitrust laws must give way. In the case of a religiously
motivated boycott the constitutional guarantee of free exercise must
be weighed against the interest of free and unfettered competition.
However, the dual aspect of the religion guarantee strongly suggests
that application of the antitrust laws would be appropriate. If liabil-
ity under the Sherman Act is not tantamount to a virtual prohibition
of the right of free exercise, it is constitutionally permissible. This
is particularly true where the lawful purpose claimed by the defen-
dants as their main one could have been achieved by other means
at less cost to competition and at little or no cost to the defendants.
To hold otherwise would impermissibly advance the exercise of a par-
ticular religion, thereby violating the establishment ban. Government
may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essen-
tial to the accomplishment of an overriding governmental policy or
program. The need to maintain an organized society that guarantees
religious freedom to all legitimizes this limitation on acts, not belief.
Such a guarantee requires that some religious practices yield to the
common good-free and unfettered competition.
Sally F. Rogers
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